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THE FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY IN NEW MEXICO,
'
1858-1880

By FRANK D. REEVE
PREFACE
EVERAL studies have been made on the subject of the federal Indian policy in New Mexico.from the beginning of
the American pccupation to 1860. But not until th~ sixties
was the reservation policy first applied inNew Mexico and
it was being carried to completion <:luring the seventies. It
is the. purpose 'of the writer to trace the course of events
from 1858 to 1880 In the application of this restrictive policy
to the nomadic tribes in New Mexico. The year'1858 is taken
as the starting point because of the outbreak of war with the
Navaho which persisted' until they were rounded up and sent
to a reservation on the banks of the Pecos river.
The source material is found mostly in the archives of
the office of Indian affairs, Washington, ·D. C. The incoming
correspondence up to the year 1880 is filed in bundles, one
or more for each year, under the name of the territory. A
full citation to the file for a letter from agent to commissioner would· be: Department of interior, office of Indian
affairs, New Mexico, letter number (for. instance, T145)
and year, as 1878. For purposes of brevity and simplicity,
. these citations will appear in the footnQtes with only the
letter number and year; ·for example, 1''145/78; Letters referred to in ,the files for Colorado territory ,will be designated by prefixIng the name of the territory: Colo. T145/78.
The outgoing correspondence in the office of Indian af- .
fairs is found in the Letter Books and Report Books, both
numbered consecutively by volume. They will be cited as
LB and RB with the volume and page number.
A full citation to the material consulted in the department of war would be as follows: Department of war, adjutant general's office, organization records group of the' old
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records division, New Mexico. Incoming correspondence is
filed under the appropriate year in boxes marked Letters
Received. The footnote citation will appear as A. G. 0., letter number and year (C19/65). Outgoing correspondence
appears in books marked Letters Sent; the volumes .are
numbered consecutively. The footnote citation will appear
as A. G. 0., LS, volume and page number.
'
Other footnote abbreviations are as follows:
A. G.-adjutant general
A. A. G.-assistant adjutant general
A. A. A. G.-acting assistant adjutant general
B. I: C.---"Board of Indian commissioners
C. I. A.--commissioner of Indian affairs
I. P. C.-Indian peace commission
J. S. C.-joint special committee, Condition of the
Indian tribes, 1867,
R. R.-War of rebellion, Official Records
R. C. D.-Senate of the United states, Regular Confidential Documents
U. S. S. L.-United States Statutes at Large
Kappler, Indian affairs: laws and treaties, will be
cited by author only.
Due to the numerous references to newspapers and
manuscripts, dates are rendered in Arabic numerals, rather
than written out, for the, sake of economy 'of space in the
footnotes.
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white man penetrated this continent he came
into contact with a people of a different race, of a
different level of civilization, of a different psychology. The
superior race took the initiative in working out the' relations
between the two; the problem proved to be a very difficult
one. Well into the nineteenth century, and for that matter
today, there were differences of opinion as to the proper
course to pursue toward the native race. Was the Indian to
be exterminated, or civilized and permitted to take his place
in the white man's scheme of life? He was looked upon
either as

W

HEN THE

"Lo! the poor Indian whose untutored mind
Saw God in the forest, and heard him in the wind."
or
"Hi! the filthy redskin and his filthier squaw
who cares for nothing but fill their dirty paws."l
The experiences of the frontiersman often led him to
express an opinion in favor of harsh treatment, even of
extermination, if necessary, to solve the problem. The
easterner was more under the influence of the humanitarian
spirit.2 However, the conflict of opinion was not purely
sectional, and a peaceful solution, if possible, was preferable,
but solution there must be. The difficulty of finding it was
. enhanced by the character of the Indian who was an enigma
to the white man:
Voluptuary and stoic; swept by gusts of fury
too terrible to be witnessed, yet imperturbable
beyond all men, under the ordinary excitements and
accidents of life; garrulous, yet impenetrable;
curious, yet himself reserved; proud and mean,
alike beyond compare; superior to torture and the
presence of certain death, yet, by the standards of

---1. L. R. Hafen, The Overland Mail, 1849·1869, p. 241.

2. "It is doubtful if there be " people on earth concerning whom there is so wide a
- difference of opinion as the North America Indians. . . . No amount of- reason, no
statement of facts, will ever change the opinion· of either eastern or western people
on this subject:' R. 1. Dodge, Hunting Grounds of the Great West, p. 255.
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all other peoples, a coward in battle; capable of
magnanimous actions which, when uncovered of-all
romance, are worthy of the best days of Roman
virtue, yet more cunning, false, and cruel than the.
Bengalee-this .copper-colored sphinx, this riddle
unread of men equally fascinates and foils the
inquirer. 3
The complicated governmental system of the conquerors
was not conducive to a speedy and· good solution of the problem. Three agencies were able to dabble in the management
of the Indian: the military, the Indian office, and to a lesser
extent the territorial officials. With a dash of immoral behavior on the part of some of the officials and other individuals thrown in for good measure, the Indian needed a strong
constitution to survive the ordeal. Yet, through all the intriCacies and confusions Of the matter, there was a strong
feeling that the savage should be dealt with fairly, and helpe(i
along the road to civilization.
The problem of controlling the nomadic Indians in New
Mexico was inherited from the Mexican government. Although it was similar iI} many respects to the problem of
dealing with those of the Great Plains, it was complicated
by a hereditary feud between the Navaho and Apache on the
one hand, and the settler of Spanish and Spanish-Indian
descent on the other. Both sides enslaved their prisoners.
and enriched themselves by flocks of sheep and other property that were taken on raids. The American ·gov.ernment
had assumed the further responsibility, by the treaty of
Guadalupe-Hidalgo, of preventing the Indians north of the
Mexican-American boundary line from raiding the settlements to the south of that line, although this responsibility
was later abrogated under the terms of· the Gadsden Purchase.
From the beginning of the American occupation of New
Mexico, efforts were made to establish and maintain peace
with them. Colonel A. W. Doniphan visited the Navaho
before proceeding southward to engage in the campaigns of
3. F. A. Walker, "The Indian Question," in North American Review, cxvi, 336·37
(April, 1873)_
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the Mexican war., From that time numerous treaties or
terms ·of peace were signed until all were finally placed on
reservations, but' the agreements were often broken by one
side or the other.
. The civil administration of Indian affairs in the territory of New Mexico was established by the appointment of
James S~ Calhoun as superintendent in 1849. He received
the additional responsibility of territorial governor in 1851,
but the two offices were separated in 1857. Four agents
were provided by congress in 1851. Although control of
Indians had been transferred from the department of war.
to the newly ~reate? department of interior'in 1849, the military, of necessity, had much to do with them because of the
frequent hostilities. Friction between the civil and military
officials developed in regard to jurisdiction, and differences
of opinion arose as to the proper policy to follow.
During his tenure of office, one idea was advanced by
Calhoun and remained persistently in the foreground thereafter; namely, that the Indians should be placed in a restricted area and forced to follow the path of peace. After
the appointment of James S. Collins as superintendent in
1857 some progress began to be made. The Civil War intervened, however, and delayed the d~velopment of this policy.
"Before it was consummated, much fighting was done, many
presents were distributed to the savages, and signatures
were placed on numerous documents agreeing to peace and
friendship until the nomads were finally rounded up and
placed on permanent reservations. . "
The Indians dealt with in this study can' be divided
into four groups. The Navaho inhabited the area in northwestern New Mexico south of the San Juan river; they
raided into the Rio Grande valley and points eastward. The
JicariIla Apache and three bands of Dte Indians roamed
over northern New Mexico and southern Colorado. In the
southern part of the territory were the Mescalero Apache,
ranging from the Pecos country to the Rio Grande, and the
,Gila Apache in southwestern New Mexico, both with a habit
of raiding into Mexico.
I

.

I

.
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CHAPTER I
THE '~AVAHO, 1858-1862

peace existed with the Navaho in 1858, but
A
. there was always the possibility of war breaking out
because of some untoward incident.. A likely sOurce of
NOMINAL

trouble was the grazing ground set aside for the cavalry ..
horses at Fort Defiance. The Indian stock occasionally intruded upon the reserved past~res, much to the annoya'nce of
the post commander. In the spring'of that year the military
took drastic action to end this practice by killing about sixty
horses belonging to the tribesmen. 1 This rash act brought no
retaliation. Such passive behavior by the Navaho would
bear out the truth of the opinion often expressed in, those
'years th~t they were' largely in favor of remaining on
friendly terms with the white man, and that the real cause of
difficulty lay, in the actions of a few troublers called ladrones.
They, it was believed, belonged to the have-nots of the tribe,
consequently they felt the necessity of plundering as a means
of making a living and perhaps attaining rank as ricos. But
with this incident passed, another of a different character
finally brought an end to the uncertaip period of peace.
A Navaho who had been lounging around the fort on
July 11 suddenly shot an arrow into the back of a negro boy,
a slave of Brevet Major W. T. H. Brooks, the post commander. ' A doubtful explanation of his conduct lay in a
current belief that Navaho custom called for the killing of
.a non-tribesman as a means of settling a marital dispute..
More than likely, however, the negro had irritated the Indian
in some way. ' But regardless of the motive, Major Brooks
demanded of a chief, Sarcillo Largo, that the guilty man be
surrendered on a charge of murder. That was the white·
man's view of the case. The chief would not, 'or could not
comply. The latter is the better interpretation of his con- .
duct because the Navaho had no tribal government worthy of "
the name., They were essentially individualistic, owing but
1.

J, L. Collins to A. B. Greenwood, 2/4/60, C399/60.
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a nominal allegiance to some group chieftain. Furthermore,
a killing from their point of view could be atoned for by a
, payment of goods, and they were willing to make payment
in this case. 2
On the 21st day of July, Major Brooks gave the Indians
twenty days from the date of the murder to deliver up the
killer. He had little confidence in the effect of his ultimatum
and wrote to the department commander recommending that
a campaign be undertaken in September or earlier.~ Perhaps
his action was partly motivated by. an underlying feeling of
irritation and contempt toward the Navaho. Whether other
factors played a part or not 'is difficult to say, but Governor
Rencher at least was skeptical and believed that the~e must
be some other reasons for precipitating hostilities. 4 However the Indians further stiffened the backs of the military
by bringing in a dead Mexican captive, whom they had killed
for the occasion, and trying to pass him off as the murderer.
The victim of the Indians' strategy happened to be known to
the officers.
In keeping with the views of Brooks, war broke out,
toward the end of summer. A premature fight occurred at
Bear Springs on August 29 under the leadership of Captain
George McLane, en 1'oute to Fort Defiance with a small force.
Judging from what he called "Indian signs" that Major'
Brooks had commenced hostilities, he had determined, if no
instructions were received from Fort Defiance to the contrary, to attack at sight the first party of armed Navaho
~hat crossed' his path. But if he had not taken this precipitate action war would have resulted anyway. ,The military
could not afford to lose prestige in the 'eyeS of the Indians
by not enforcing the ultimatum. Consequently, LieutenantColonel D. S. Miles in command of a punitive expedition of
310 men took the field on September 9. 5
2. Abraham Rencher to Lewis ciss, 10/16/58, 36 Congo 2 sess. Hse. Ex. Doc. 24.
VI, 4 (1097). See also C2068/59; Congo Globe, 3/19/66, 39 Congo 1 sesS. pt. 2, 1487.
3. Brooks to A. A. G., 7/15/58, 7/22/58. 35 Congo 2 sess. Sen. Ex. Doc. I,; II.
294·97 (975).
4. Rencher to Cass, 10/16/58, 36 Congo 2 sess, Hse. Ex. Doc. 24, VI, 4, (1097).
5. McLane to Miies, 9/2/58, 36 Congo 1 sess. Sen. Ex. Doc. 2, II, 275 (l024).
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From the military standpoint, the expedition under
Miles was just one of many Indian campaigns in the history
of New Mexico. He entered Canyon de Chelly, killed six
Indians, captured a few women, children, horses, and sheep,
and lost two soldiers killed and three wounded. 6 But in
regard to the management of the Indians, the war revealed
the weak point in the governmental machinery. There was
a divided responsibility between the Indian bureau and the
military department, and a loosenes~ in the funCtioning of
each. This led to mutual criticism and sometimes to lack
of cooperation, both within and between the two services.
Superintendent Collins believed that the war had been
precipitated unwisely, but found himself in the unpleasant
position of being forced to criticise both the military and his
own agent. He thought that the demand for the ·murderer
should have been made through the office of the superintendent. The absence of this formal procedure made the military
officially responsible, in his opinion, for the action taken.
The agent, S. M. Yost, had also erred. Detailed to Fort Defiance agency, he had accompanied McLane. Instead of acting as a moderating influence on that impetuous officer, he
had been an interested spectator of the fight at Bear Springs.
And to make the matter worse, that incident had occurred in
the face of instl-uetions issued by General John Garland that
no hostile movement should be made before Yost had arrived
at Fort Defiance and had held a council with his charges. 7
Colonel B. L. E. Bonneville succeeded General Garland
as departmental commander on September 16. He approached the Indian problem with the sword in one hand and
the olive branch in the other. He chided Miles for not at"

"

6. Miles to A. A. G., 9/10/58, 35 Congo 2 SesB. Sen. Ex~ Doc. I, II, 309-313 (975).
7. Collins, Annual Report, 9/27/58/. 35 Cong." 2 BeSB. Sen. Ex. Doc. I, I, 542ff
(974)". Collins to Greenwood, 2/4/60, C399/60. Collins to J. W. Denver, 3/27/59.
C2003/59. Collins to C. E. Mix, 11/29/58, CI815/59. McLane to MileB, 9/2/58, 36
Congo 1 sess. Sen. Ex. Doc. 2, II. 275 (1024).
Miles to A. A. G., 9/8/58, 35 Congo 2 BeSB. Sen. Ex. Doc. I, II, 307-09 (975). Miles to
A. G. 9/3/58, ibid., p. 298.
See bibliography under A. B. Bender for details of military operations in New
Mexico.
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tending a council that Yost held with the Navaho (without
results), but approved his conduct in taking the field on the
basis of the murder and substitution. He instructed him to
press the matter by active operation, but not to allow any
"opportunity of negotiating to escape the moment they manifest a sincere desire to comply with your demand." 8
A second force was put in the field in October under
Major Electus Backus, leaving Albuquerque on the 19th for
Fort Defiance, by way of San Isidro and Canyon de Chelly.
He was instructed to "destroy and drive" from the Tuni-chey
country '~every vestige" of the Navaho. But the major was
not quite so stern. Near Black Lake a party of Indians ap. peared on the. mesa ina peaceful attitude: "Hoping· for a
favorable result, I directed that they should not be disturbed...." Granting that this was a peace party, there was
also a hostile· party elsewhere, a distinction which the
friends of the Navaho claimed was a permanent condition..
The hostiles ran off sixty-two mules in October from the
post herd at Fort Defiance, killing two soldiers and wounding
four others. 9
The original cause of the war was soon lost sight of,
and a more general purpose of teaching the Navaho that they
must give up their old practice of depredating on the settlements was substituted. As Collins wrote in his annual report, "I have been less anxious
to secure a settlement of
the
. .
,
difficulty on account of the bad conduct of the Indians, anterior to the murder of Major Brooks' hoy, than for this im~
mediate offense." In 'achieving this aim no distinctiqn could
be made between the friendly Indians arid the ladrones because there was no way to separate them. Consequently, all
must suffer for the misdoings of the few. The only exceptions were a small group known as Sandoval's band that lived
near Ceb,olleta and had been on peaceful terms with the
settlers for many years. The Washington office agreed with
,

(

8. Bonneville to Miles, 9/23/58, 35 Congo 2 seSs. Sen. Ex. Doc. I, n, 315 (975r.
9. Bonnevile to Backus, 10/3/58, 35 Congo 2 sess.Sen. Ex; Doc. I, n, 320 (975).
Backus to Lane, Report, 11/19/58, 36 Congo 1 ses•. Sen. Ex. Doc. 2, n, 281 (1024).
Bonneville to Thoma., 10/23/58, ibid., p. 257.
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the sentiment of Collins that definitive results must be
attained. lO
The strength of the idea of a definitive campaign increased among the military officers in direct ratio to their
distance from the field of operations. Bonneville believed
that the Navaho wanted peace, but doubted that it would be
permanent and thought it better to "continue operations
until they shall feel more sensibJy the effect of their bad
conduct." Accordin,g to 'the secretary of war, there was to
be no let up in' the war "until the savages are brought absolutely under the yoke."11 On the other hand, the idea of
warfare held by Miles was not conducive to attaining the desired end. He believed that a campaign was only ·feasible in
the months between corn-growing time and cold weather
because the horses were dependent on the Navaho crops for
forage, and the lack of wood made a cold weather scout
inadvisable. 12
Peace was soon in the offing, but it was not to be secured
without some inharmonious sounds in the Indian service.
The agent had had an unhappy time at Fort Defiance.'There
were no offidal quarters provided by the. Indian bureau;
consequently the military played host. This was galling to
the pride of Yost, who was unduly sensitive about the dignity
of his position. Feeling that there w~s no need for his
services after having turned over to the army the responsibility for Indian management upon the outbreak of hostilities, he returned to the settlements. Collins tartly o!dered
him to return,. criticised him. for a false notion of a want of
indep·endence at Fort Defiance, and stated that an efficient
agent would have prevented the outbreak of war. 13
10. 9/27/58',.35 Congo 2 BesB.' Sen. Ex, Doc. 1, I, 542 (974). C. 1. A., Annual
11/6/58, RB 11, p. 9111. Bonneville to, Thomas, 11/14/58, 36 Congo 1 sess. Sen. Ex, Doc. 2, II, 268
(1024). Secretary of War, Annual Report, 1858, 35 Congo 2 sess. Sen.. Ex. Doc. 1, II,
5 (975).
12. Miles to Nichols, 9/10/58,35 Congo 2sess. Sen, Ex. Doc. 1, II, 309.313, (975).
13. Collins to Yost, 10/15/58, C1813/59. Yost to Collins, 11/6/58, and Collins
to Mix, 11/20/58, C1803/59.
Report,
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Yost returned to his a!5ency 'in a resentful mood, for a
short stay, and then added to the irritation of Collins by
taking the initiative in a movement for peace. Miles had
asked Bonneville to abandon the demand for the murderer.
In view of this, Yost decided to propose a peace conference
on the return of Miles from a fifteen days' scout. His intention created two questions: had the Navaho been sufficiently
chastised, and in which department of government lay the
responsibility for negotiating the peace. Collins thought
the responsibility belonged to the military as a war function.
But what was more important, if the war had been heedlessly entered into he thought that it should not' be ended
in the same manner. The Indians were deserving of a severe
lesson for long continued misbehavior, and a permanent
peace was highly desirable. The officers, as he stated, should
not grow tired of campaigning just because Christmas was
approaching. 14
To forestall mismanagement of the peace movement,
Bonneville and Collins put their heads together and decided
that they should assume direct control. They accordingly
instructed their respective subordinates to bring a delegation
of Navaho chiefs to Albuquerque for a conference, provided
that they evinced a sincere desire for peace, agreed to commit
no more depredations, and would follow the a:dvice of the
government in the future. 15 Meanwhile, Collins' fear of a
premature peace had been realized. Miles entered into a
thirty day armistice on November 20, essentially on the basis
of the status quo ante bellum.
The territorial citizens were the most personally con-:cerned in the Navaho situation because they had been the
real victims of the Indians'·misdoings. Governor Rencher,
the official representative of their interests, was critical of
both the military and Indian service officials for allowing
the war to break out, since the destruction of Indian crops
and stock tended to make them more dependent on maraud14. Collins to Yost. 11/19/58. CI803/59. Collins to Mix, 11/29/58, CI815/59.
15. Bonneville to Miles; 11/21/58, 36 Congo 1 sess. Sen. Ex. Doc. 2, II, 269 (1024 )".
Collins to Yost, 11/22/58, CI816/59.
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ing for a living, despite the fact that such punishment was
designed to teach them to behave otherwise. 16 In his annu,al
message to the territorial legislature, he discussed the subject of Indian depredations at considerable length. The
legislature in, reply requested information in regard to 'the
progress of the war. The governor could not answer on the
basis of possessing official information, but he was no
stranger to the leaders in the other branches of the federal
. government in ;New Mexico and knew the ins and outs of
their policies. He explained the course of events down to
the time of the armistice, and then grew slightly sarcastic:
If, therefore, the Indians have been ~stigated
and humbled as our Indian Agent says they have,
we ought to be glad of it, because it is what ought
to be done, and if true, has certainly been done
without the effusion of 'much blood, and shows an
humble and submissive spirit on the part of the
Navajoes, which has not been thought heretofore
a part of their character.
He assured the legislators that the terms of the armistice·
would not be accepted by Collins 'and Bonneville as the basis
of peaceY
The plan to bring a delegation 'Of Indian chiefs' to the
settlements to talk peace was abandoned. Boimeville and
Collins journeyed to Fort Defiance and peace was concluded
on December 25, 1858. The terms were as follows: the Navaho
were, to restore or pay for the property taken since August
15, and if the indemnities were not paid the troops could
make reprisals in kind; the whole nation would be held responsible in the future for depredations; Pueblo Indian and
Mexican captives were to be surrendered and the Navaho
prisoners of war were to be released; the murderer of the
negro was not. demanded, it being understood that he had
gone to parts unknown and would not be given future
asylum:; the military retained the right to scout through the
16. Re;'cher to Cass, 10/16/58 and 11/29/58, 36 Congo 2 sess. Hse. Ex. Doc. 24, VI,
5 (1097). See also C1839/59.
. 17. Special Message, 12/17/58, New Mexico Executive Records, 1851-1867, p.
208-09.
.
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Navaho country, establish posts, and reserve necessary grazing and farming lands; Huero, elected head chief, would be
dealt with as the leader of the nation; and an eastern boundary for the Navaho country was agreed upon, running in a
direct line from Piscado Spring at the head of the Zuni river,
to Bear Springs near the Albuquerque-Fort Defiance road,
from there
to the ruins of the Escondido on the Chaco
river,
\
'
thence to the junction of the Chaco and San,Juan rivers. No
grazing or farming was to be permitted east of the line.18
The most important- features of the treaty were the attempt, to develop a sense of collective responsibility on the
part of the Navaho by rendering obedience to a single headchief, the delimitation of the territory they should occupy
with the idea of keepingthem at a suitable distance from the
settlements, and the rightsbf the troops, to make reprisals if
the indemnities were not paid.. In order to emphasize their
future status, the Indians were informed that "they must
either give up their habits of dishonesty and live as peace, able and quiet neighbors, or be driven from their country, if
not exterminated."19
Despite the reiterated statement of Collins that the military should assume the. responsibility for peace, the opposite
had occurred. Yost having'initiated the movement,Collins
was ,largely, instrumental in carrying it to compJetion. 20 He
was alterpiitely optimisticimd pessimistic about the ultimate
result. After comlpenting, "I think they will not wantonly
incur our displeasure again,'" he pointed out that all~ 'the
Navaho bands, for various reasons, were'not represented
in the peace council, and those pr'esent "were of the peace
party." "It may not therefore be prudent to 'place too much
reliance upon the evidence presented by the conduct of the
Indians who met us in council, tho' Armijo [another chief]
,

18, Articles of Peace, 12/25/58, C1885/59. or Y42/59. The Escondido is about,
fifteen miles west of the Pueblo Bonito ruins in Chaco Canyon.
19. Collins to Denver, 1/8/59, C1885/59.
'
20. Collins to Mix. 12/3/58. CI829/59. Bonneville. General Orders No. 11. 36
Cong: 1 sess. Sen. Ex, Doc. 2. II 273. (1024). Mix to Thompson, 7/14/60. RB 11.,p. 452.
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.told me that the desire for peace was universal in the
tribe...." 21
Bonneville concurred in the terms drawn. up, likewise
Governor Rencher, but the irritating Yost was not so satisfied. He maintained that the boundary line deprived the
Navaho of their best· lands, consequently they would be
forced to ignore it or become pensioners of the government.
He further charged that the many claims against the Indians
for stolen property should be directed at the Mexicans and
the Sandoval band, and that the main part of the tribe had
committed no depredations during the past six months. '~Be
cause they are wealthy it seems that the system is-to be officially recognized of making them the prey of every vagabond
who may be so wanting in conscience as to swear to a false- '
hood." 22 But the complaint of Yost was not entirely sound.
The evidence does not support his attack against the San~,
doval band. The charge against the Me~icans, however, was
a common one during the period of this study, and it was
'sometimes made against Anglo-Americans~ No doubt there'
was some truth in this accusation, but it cO,uld not have been
so one-sided as Yost would have us believe. The settlers in
the Rio Grande valley had had several decades of experience
with the Navaho raids and wer~ rightfully convinced of the
source of much, of their losses.. On the other hand, it was
not difficult to commit a theft in a frontier region and blame
it on the IndiaI).s without the falseness olthe charge being
discovered.
The superintendent and the agent soon came to the
parting of the ways. The ,crowning act of Yost was to reveal to the military officers at Fort Defiance some slighting
remarks that Collins had made about the campaign~ . Th'e
agent was also at odds with the governor. Collins lost all
confidence in his ability and usefulness: "He is really so
full of vanity, malace, arid most of the time of whiskey, that·
it makes him not only a fool, ,but renders him obnoxious to '
21.
22.

Collins to Denver, 1/8/59. C1885/59,
ColIins to Denver. 1/13/59, C1892/59.

Miles to Yost, 12/20/5l>. Y42/59.
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all well meaning men." He was granted a sixty day leave of
absence in April and left for a trip to his home in Missouri. 28
His career as agent illustrated certain weaknesses in: the
Indian service: a political appointee from the East, he found
it difficult to adapt himself to the frontier environment of
an Indian agency; and frequent changes in agents were not
conducive to the development of a smooth and efficient management of Indian affairs.
The appointment of R. Y. Cowart as agent in September, 1858, and his assi~ment to the Navaho in December,
continued the unsatisfactory situation which had existed
under Yost. The new incumbent had somehow acquired exaggerated ideas of the scope Of his work and perhaps also
the amount of "rake-off" to' be secured. He arrived in Santa
Fe with three assistants, having dropped a lucrative legal
practice at home to accept the appointment. He was soon
disillusioned about his new field and concluded that he could
not remain, although he did proceed to Fort Defiance, arriving February 24, 1859, for a short stay. He had readily
become a convert to the prevailing feeling that the Navaho
should be kept within definite boundaries and held respon:..
sible as a group for the misdoings of the few. Otherwise, he
was highly critical of the prevailing condition: "in my
humble judgment, the Government is but putting a plaster
on the surface of an ulcer, that sooner or later must destroy
-the wholesistem, unless' prompt an active measures are
taken in the premises, for almost all within is rotten to
putrafaction." 24
Collins sharply criticised the Washington office for the
appointment of Cowart because he favored the selection of
New Mexicans who would be more familiar with the Indians,
accustomed to the frontier, and yet equal in other respects
to the Eastern appointees: "If the Department was fully
aware of the great trouble and inconvenience that is occa28. Collins to Mix, 4/26/59, C2068/59 and 11/22/58, C1808/59. Collins to Denver,
8/81/59, C2018/59 and 1/13/59, C1892/59.
24. Cowart to J. Thompson, 1/8/59, C1896/59.
Collins to Mix 12/10/58,
J959/59.
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sioned by sending us inexperienced and inefficient men for
agents, I think they would certainly try to remedy the evil
in the appointments hereafter to be made."25 He was also
irritated by the failure, of .the new agent to file his bond before proceeding to his post of duty. But if another change
would please him, he s,oon had a chance to know, because
Cowart resigned and left Fort Defiance'in April: He might
have remained longer in the service if stationed at a more
congeni'al location such as Santa Fe, but he pulled political
wires for that purpose without effect because the one prerogative that the superintendent had was the assignment of
agents to their posts, even'if the appointments did originate
in Washington.
J
The frequent change Of agents led the military to assume greater responsibilities. Major O. S. Shepherd was
assigned to the. Fort Defiance command, }?ebruary 1,.1859,
with instructions to recognize the agent as the official to
whoni. the Navaho should look for guidance. The military
were forced to protect the settlements against raids, but no
offensive operations were to be ,undertaken without positive
orders. When Cowart left, new instructions were issued to
Shepherd. Matters in regard to the treaty were recognized
as belonging to the agent, but if the Navaho committed offenses in the absence of the agent the military were to secure
redress. When citizens followed up stolen stock and presented proper affidavits of their loss, the military should
make demands on the Indians for the property and use force
if necessary/to recover ft. 26
These instructions were not entirely pleasing to Collins.
He recognized the superiority of the Navaho to other Indians, the possibilities of civilizing them, and the harmful
effects of war, put he was a legalIst when it came to interpreting the law. Curr,ent losses were to .be prevented and
recouped, of course, but a treaty was a law and must be
obeyed to the last word. .And the treaty provided for in25. Collins to Greenwood, 6/4/59, C3007/59,
26. J. D. Wilkins to Shepherd, 2/1/59 and 4/20/59, 36 Congo 1 sess. Sen. Ex. Doc.
2, II, 296-297 (1024).
'
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demnities already past due which could be collected by force
if necessary. It was the duty of the military to enforce the
treaty, and that meant offensive action. The Navaho had
bound themselves to the principle of collective responsibility
and should be treated accordingly. Consequently, the peace
party was responsible for the behavior Of the ladrones. This
might be repugnant to justice and humanity, but he thought'
there was no alternative; neither in the terms of the treaty
nor in the realm of ideas could any other plan be found.
When Major Alexander Baker was appointed temporary
agent to the Navaho in April, he was instructed that the
terms of peace must be strictly insi~ted upon. 27 Thus the
military and civil officials were not entirely in harmony; and
unfortunately for the Navaho they also lacked unity and
harmony of 'action.
'
The winter passed quietly. It was a bad time for marauding expeditions anyway. But whether the inclement
weather or a change of ways had produced the calm, Collins
sent his clerk, John Ward, to.Fort Defiance in April, 1859, to
distribute presents. The Navaho had really earned their
gifts; besides remaining at peace for a short while, they had
returned about 100 sheep stolen on the Rio Puerco. But
they fell from grace the next month. Two complaints were
registered again.st them. The agent at Abiquiu, Albert H.
Pfeiffer, requested authority to raise an armed company to
punish some raiders. Henry Connelly reported that 3,000
shee.p had been stolen from Felipe Chaves in the Rio Abajo;
the Indians had passed the night with two herders and had
then killed them before taking leave with the flock. He
thought the savages should be taught their treaty obligations
and the murderers punished. 28
To check the incipient outbreak of hostilities, several
scouts were made through the Navaho country during the
summer. As fall approached, the civil officials became increasingly insistent on the enforcement of the treaty, while
27.
28.

Collins to Denver, 1/8/59, C1885/59. Collins to Baker, 6/12/59, C42/59.
Connelly to Collins, 5/13/59, and Pfeiffer 'toCoIlins, 5/15/59, C2087/59.
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the military could not be convinced of the need for a real
campaign. When the Simonson expedition was being fitted
out in May for a peaceful reconnaissance which the treaty
permitted, Collins believed that war could hardly be avoided.
, In addition to the scouting activities, several councils wer,e
held with the Navaho and they promised to restore stolen
property. But by Septe'mber the superintendent was of the
opinion that a, peaceful solution to the problem was impossible, and that strong measures should be adopted while
the troops were in force at Fort Defiance. 29 He emphasized
this view with the charge that the military seemed unwilling
to enforce the treaty whic_h called for counter reprisals: "The
whole object of the treaty turned upon this point. It was for
this that the Indians were left in the hands of the military.
They deserve no mercy at our hands, and should be taught
to expect none."30
The departmental commander was not to be stampeded
into action. After all, the officers of the Indian service were
more directly sensitive to the public demand for redress of
gl'ievances and might be expected to be restive under a conciliatory policy which produced inadequate results. The
military, on the other hand, were farther removed officially
from the public sentiment. They emphasized the point that
the large majority of the Navaho were in favor of peace.
:Bonneville estimated the number of ladrones. as, low as
, eighteen or twenty. They would appear in the settlements
as friends, perhaps stay overnight, and suddenly disappear
with property. That was certainly annoying, but hard to
stop, like individual thieving in the white man's society.
Moreover, he attributed the unsettled state of affairs in part
to the frequent change in agents, and definitely opposed war.
A campaign he believed would convert 10,000 self-sustaining
people into robbers obliged to live by stealing, or into dependents upon the charity of the government. Thus the futility;
29. Collins, Annual Report, 9/17/59, 86 Congo 1 sess. Sen. Ex. Doc. 1, I, 716
(1028). Collins to Greenwood, 5/29/59, C2099/59.
80. Annual Report, 9/17/59, 86 Congo 1 sess. Sen. Ex. Doc. 1, I, 707 (1028).

236

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

of expecting the Navaho to adopt the practice of collective
responsibility was recognized. 31 . His argument was certainly
sound in theory, but still the fact remained that the treaty
was not respected, losses were still occurring, and claims
were piling up against the government. 32
Silas F. Kendrick was appointed July 1, 1859, as successor to Cowart. At the same time Simonson was instructed
to take possession of any flock of sheep when requested to do
so by the agent, and to punish Indians guilty of theft. . But
no general war. was to be started except by order from. the
department commander unless the Indians started a general
uprising. 33 At this point the secretary of war intervened:
It is not deemed advisable that even isolated
attacks on the Indians shall depend rigidly on an intimation of the Indian agent. The authority and
influence of the agent must be sustained, but the
commander himself, in the absence of orders from
higher authority, will judge whether the circumstances require that the Indians, or particular parties of them, shall be punished, and the responsibility of the decision must rest solely on him. 34 -

Kenrick attempted to settle the difficulties arising from
non-observance of the treaty by direct negotiation. He held
three councils with the Indians in September. The number
in attendance varied from about 400 to' 1,000. The agent
demanded the payment of the claims, amounting to about
$14,000, and the surrender of the -murderers of the two
Mexican herders. The Navaho had returned stock to the
value of about ;LOper cent of the claims and now complained
that they were unable to pay any more. Moreover, they presented unpaid claims for'losses sustained from retaliatory
raids. They also contended that they were not responsible
for the conduct of their bad men. The climax to the nego81. BonneviIle to Thomas, 8/14/59 and 8/31/59, 36 Congo 1 sess. Sen. Ex. Doc.
2, II, 310, 313f (1024). Simonson and Shepherd were of the same general opinion.
Ibid., p. 311, 327.
.
32. Greenwood to James Harlan, 1/23/59, LB 61, p. 385.
33. Wilkins to Simonson, 8/12/59, 36 Congo 1 sess. Sen. Ex. Doc. 2, II, 312, (1024).
34. J. B. Floyd, 36 Congo 1 sess. Hse. Ex. Doc. 69, IX, 27. (1051).
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tiations was a thirty-day ultimatum for· the restoration of
the balance of the property due under the terms of the treaty.
The period of grace elapsed on October 25. Kendrick, under
instruction froin his superior, made a formal demand on
Major Shepherd for military enforcement of the treaty.35
If the superintendent was insistent upon the' enforcement of the treaty, he was not so legalistic in other'respects.
As Simonson justly pointed out, the value of claims against
the Navaho was not established on' the' testimony of those
who had suffered the losses; there was no adjudication by an
impartial body; and a war to collect them afforded the op. portunity for 'private parties to depredate under a guise of
,legality. He protested against a general war to ~nforce
proper behavior on the part of the few wrong-doers. 36 But
the prospects of plunder for some, and protection for others,
would naturally make the policy of the civil department for
the enforcement of the treaty more popular than the reluctance of the military'to wage war.
'
) Meanwhile, an incident occurred in October that pre-:cipitated hostilities. In response to another complaint, a
small force was sent after the Navaho raiders. If unsuccessful, Major Shepherd was instructed to take all available
force from Fort Defiance and strike an effective blow at the
Indians in that vicinity, sufficiently hard to put an end to
depredations. This was not, however, to result in a general war, The major protested ang. advanced several objections to obeying the orders: the thirty-day ultimatum had
not expired, a general war would result, the. whereabouts
of the guilty ones was uncertain, the peaceful ones would
suffer, winter was approaching, the settlements would suffer
from Indian attacks, "and here I may with propriety add,
that I am not unaware that the mouthing polltician and the
land warrant speculators, in office as well as those out, crave
the very state of 'things of which I suggest an avoidance;"
there are idle and vicious men in every town who desire en35, Kendrick to Shepherd. 10/25/59, C249/59. Kendrick to Collins, 2/25/60,
C492/60.
,
Simonson to Wilkins, 9/20/59, 36 Con. 1 sess. Sen.. Ex. Doc. 2, 11,341, (1024).

36.
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rollment as volunteers for plunder. But the orders were
carried out; two Indians were killed and six wounded. 37
Colonel Thomas T. Fauntleroy succeeded Bonneville as
department commander, October 15, 1859, and adopted a
cautious policy. He withdrew the troops from the field because of the approaching winter and to allow himself time
to study the problem before embarking on a serious campaign. The claims that had accumulated against the Navaho
were viewed with suspicion. They were considered in many
cases to be wholly fabricated or exaggerated, and if they
were sufficient cause for war, then "the cause for war be:..
comes interminable, or the Indians must be exterminated."
These claims should either be repudiated entirely or properlyadjudicated.
The troops should be employed in the defense
of the Territory, giving immediate protection to
life and property within the same, and carrying
war into the enemy's country, only in instant pursuit for depredations committed, or making inva..
sions in case of murder, when of a character, and
under circumstances which evince a general hostile
feeling, or for the enforcement of the delivery of
offenders in case of these murders. 38
His views sounded well on·paper, but had been,a failure
in practice in the past. The military had had poor success
in immediate pursuit of raiders, and had failed to secure the
murderer in the campaign of 1858. Furthermore, they
aroused the ire of Collins and the people who believed that
the treaty of 1858 had not been properly enforced. The
37. Shepherd to Wilkins, 10/14/59, 86 Congo 1 sess. Hse. Ex. Doc. 69, IX, 8·9, 14
(1051). WiLkins to Shepherd, 10/2/59, 36 Congo 1 sess. Sen. Ex. Doc. 2. II, 340 (1024).
It was a nip·and·tuckaffair to secure property indemnity. Shepherd captured 65
horses, including a crippled mare with foal, and 136 goats. They were started for the
Rio Grande with an escort. The first night out the Indians stampeded all but 19 of the
horses; the soldiers were forced to kill the mare, six more gave out on the march, the
foal was left at Algodones, and the remaining 12 were turned over to Collins at Santa
Fe. Kendrick to Collins, 2/25/60, C492/60.
The Navaho stole a flock of sheep from the post at Defiance. Shepherd to Wilkins,
11/19/59,36 Congo 1 sess. Hse. Ex. Doc. 69, IX, 15, 18 (1051).
38. Fauntleroy to Thomas, 11/6/59, 36 Congo 1 sesa. Hse. Ex. Doc. 69, IX, 10-11
(1051).
.

THE FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY

239

superintendent insisted that the claims that had been presented were just and that the military should collect them. 39
- The commissioner of Indian affairs echoed the views of Collins: the Navaho "will probably have to be more thoroughly
, chastised in order to impress upon them a proper sense of
their treaty obligations ..." 40
Governor Rencher discussed the situation in his message to the legislature in December and recommended that
each settlement organize a company for its own defense. 41
The legislators, however, were interested in something more
than self-defense. They addressed a joint resolution to the
governor asking for more deta~led information about the
status of the Navaho and the enforcement of the treaty.
Several resolutions of censure were introduced, directed at
the military and Indian officials.42 In obedience to the joint
resolution, Rencher wrote to Collins and Fauntleroy for official statements of Indian affairs. The superintendent .re.,
plied, but the commandant was not so obliging.
In his reply to Rencher, Collins reviewed the Indian
situation for the past several years, reiterated his chronic
complaint that the military should have followed a firm and
just policy of enforcement of the treaty, and emph~sized the
significance of the provision for reprisals: "These were the
strong points in the treaty upon which I relied to produce
an effect upon the Indians, as well as to do justice to the
citizens for the losses sustained by them."43
Fauntleroy finally matured his views as to a plan of
action. A general reorganization ·of the military defenses
in the Department of New Mexico was proposed. This in~
eluded the abandonment. of Fort Defiance and the location
of a new· post at Ojo del Oso (Bear Springs), about forty
miles to the southeastward on the main route to Alb.uquerque.
A request was made for ten companies of volunteers, or an
39.

40.
41.
'42.
43.

Collins to Fauntleroy, 12/4/59, C310/60.
Annual Report, 11/26/59, RB 11, p. 274.
New Mexico, Executive Records, 1851..1867, p. 227.
Collins to Greenwood, 2/4/60, C399/60.
Collins to Rencher, 1/21/60, C399/60.
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additional regiment of regular troops, and. permission to
secure the services of 300 Ute Indians, inveterate foes of the
Navaho. Ifa general war then became necessary, he promised that "the Navajoe difficulties will never be again heard
of." 44 In accomplishing this end he objected to the practice
of independent companies taking the field. He refused to
sanction them or to furnish ammunition for their use.
The policy of Fauntleroy placed him under a cross fire
of criticism. His request for volunteers met with popular
favor; perhaps, as Collins suggested, because it was due
to the influence of men, "some of whom are well known to
you [Greenwood], who have been engaged in speculating in
Land Warrants. These men have been constantly courting
his favor ...."45 On the other hand his opposition to independent expeditions led Rencher to carry that issue to Washington, but the secretary of war sustained his subordinate.
Because of lack of funds, an increase in the regular troops
was authorized rather than the enrollment of volunteers. 46
Collins was critical of the proposal to employ the Ute
Indians against the Navaho. The previous spring he had
tried to patch up the chronic feud between the two groups by
bringing .them together in a peace meeting. He considered
war unfortunate because it ~revented the Navaho from
planting; a condition which made them more dependent on
the government, and "evil disposed Mexicans take advantage
of it to commit thefts on the credit of the Indians."47
Meanwhile, the friction which had developed between
the superintendent and cOJI.lmandant had its counterpart at
Fort Defiance. Kendrick had the ~ame complaint to make
44. Fauntleroy to Thomas, 1/29/60, 36 Congo 1 sess. Hse. Ex. Doc, 69, IX, 29
(1051). Collins to Greenwood, 4/8/60, C502/60.
Bender, UFrontier Defense in the Territory of New Mexico, 1853~1861," in Ne'Lp
Mexico Historical Review, IX, 368 (Oct., 1934) contains a detailed account of the pian
of reorganization.
45. Collins to Greenwood, 2/10/60, C413/60, and 2/12/60, C412/60.
46. Rencher to secretary of state, 2/4/60, 36 Congo 2 sess. Hse. Ex. Doc. 24, VI,
8 (1097). Townsend to Fauntleroy, 2/25/60, 36 Congo 1 sess, Hse. Ex. Doc. 69, IX, 40
(1051). New Mexico, Executive Records, 1851-1867, p. 250
47. Collins to Denver, 3/14/59, C1985/59.
Collins to Greenwood, 2/10/60,
C413/60.
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about conditions at the post as Yost and Baker had made. It
was humiliating to ask favors of the military, which, as he
said, were often granted with scant courtesy. The Indian
bureau could have ended this difficulty by building suitable
quarters for the agent but had delayed doing so because of
the unsettled condition of the Navaho. An attempt was now
made to remedy the situation by a request to the department
of war that suitable quarters be allotted for the' use of the
agent and that he be permitted to buy supplies at army
prices. 48
'
But a more serious difficulty developed. 'Shepherd had·
ordered a flogging for a friendly.Indian courier because he
held in his possession an army rifle. On January 18, 1860,
another unfortunate incident occurred in regard t9 an Indian who had entered the post for a conference. The agent
. protested against arbitrary conduct on the ,part of the military and the troublesome question of jurisdiction arose.
Shepherd ordered Kendrick to hold no more conferences
with the Indians without permission because they were in a
state of war, otherwise he must leave the post. The reply
of the agent was not framed in such language as'to promote
good feelings: "If your note is intendelj as a threat, I pass'
it by unnoticed as the ox would the passing fly that should
PElrchance light upon his horn. I will discharge my duty as
agent regardless of consequences."49
,
In view of this quarrel, Collins ordered Kendrick to
leave Fort Defiance. His usefulness there was considered
at an end because the Indians dared not enter the post, and
no hope was felt of winn.ing their confidence, until quarters
could be provided elsewhere for the agent. Shepherd had
now become a persona non grata to Collins and he declined'
to detail another agent to the Navaho until a change in command had been made: "I do suppose a more contemptable
fellow than Majr Shepherd has never disgraced the army, and
48. Kendrick to Collins, 11/20/59, C254/59. Greenwood to Collins, 12/29/59, LB
62. P. 365.
49. Kendrick to Shepherd, 1/20/60, and Kendrick to Collins, 1/23/60, C398/60.
Kendrick to Collins, 2/25/60, C492/60.
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certainly none could be less qualified to be placed in command
of a Post so important as that of Defiance."5o
Kendrick spoke with prophetic vision when he said that
no security could now be expected against the Navaho "until
they have been thoroughly conquered and humiliated." 51 The
Indians strengthened this view by their increasing boldness.
In February they ran off a flock of 30,000 sheep, east of the
Rio Grande near Socorro. The troops from Fort Craig with
the aid of volunteers recovered part of the flock with a loss
of life on both sides. The Navaho also attacked the herds at
Fort Defiance, fought the wood parties, and even made a
direct attack in May on the post; they were only beaten off
with difficulty, actually gaining access into the interior! The
very capital of the Territory was regarded with contempt;
stock was run off within sight of Santa Fe in broad daylight,
"bearding the lionin his den."52
Fauntleroy declined to undertake a general campaign
and adhered to his views of November. Collins criticised
him for inaction, public indignation increased,and despite
the opposition of the commandant, volunteer expeditions
were organized to invade the Navaho country. The attorneygeneral for the Territory, S. M. Baird, wrote: "Our condition is becoming truly desperate and no dawn of relief from
the Commandant. He could have fiddled with a Grace while
Rome was b~urning, if he had been there and I wish to God
he had." 53 .
The deadlock was finally broken in July by orders from
Washington. The impertinence of the Navaho in attacking
Fort Defiance led Shepherd to advise that "The post ought
never to be abandoned until a lasting peace is beaten into
50. Collins to Greenwood, 2/5/60, C398/60, and 3/30/60, C492/60.
51. Kendricks to Collins, 2/25/60,C 492/60.
52. Santa Fe Weekly Gazette, ,7/18/60, in C640/60.
The Gazette was owned- by Collins and edited by John T. Russell who had been appointed Indian agent in November, 1859. He was assigned temporarily to the Pueblos
and given the extra task of editing. The paper was anti-Republican at this time. See
Collins to Greenwood, 8/14/60, C737/60. Gazette, 2/2/61, in L69/63. Thompson to
Greenwood, 11/5/59, 149/59. Collins to Greenwood, 1/29/60, C343/60.
53. Baird to Editor ( of Gazette), 7/14/60 and 6/26/60, in C640/60. Collins to
Greenwood, 1/7/60, C310/60.
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these Indians, who already -believe that we are afraid of
them, judging, doubtless of our inaction in not assuming the
offensive." On the basis of this incident, the secretary of war
ordered Fauntleroy to start active operations. He made the
significant suggestion that a winter campaign would be best,
but left the matter to the discretion of the department
commander.54 '
Fauntleroy entered upon his task with reluctance:
The unfortunate relations which have rendered these operations necessary, and which will
probably occasion much suffering to all concerned
in them, may be justly attributed in part to a system of retaliatory and predatory incursions, which
have been carried on by the people of this Territory
against the Navajoes for some time past, and which
has been sanctioned by the territorial governor.55
Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel E. R. Canby was assigned
to the command of the field operations and additional troops
were brought in from Utah. A short six weeks' campaign
was planned for October and November. The rigors of a
New Mexico winter were still regarded as a, bar to war in
that season; if necessary, another blow could be struck in
the spring. The secretary of war disapproved of such tactics; he believed that the proper way was a winter campaign
by infantry traveling light in small parties, with the object
of inspiring fear by a few' decisive blows to kill. Furthermore, the Indian horses should be captured, but their sheep
and other supplies should not be distu,rbed except for supplying the troops,because wanton destruction of property
would impoverish the Navaho, turn them all into robbers,
and make necessary their extermination. Once subjugated,
a firm, just course would ensure peace. This was a very
sensible plan, but a winter campaign was to await a sterner
man than Fauntleroy.56
54. Shepherd to Wilkins, 5/7/60, 36 Congo 2 sess. Sen. Ex. Doc. 1, II, 55, (1079).
Floyd to Fauntleroy, 7/9/60, ibid., P. 60.
55. Fauntleroy to Thomas, 9/9/60, ibid., p. 66.
'56. Fauntleroy to Thomas, g/26/60, and A. G. to Fauntleroy, 10/29/60, 36 Congo
2 sess. Sen. Ex. Doc. 1, II, 63, 68 (1079).
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Private initiative had not waited upon the military for
leadership. Miguel E'-Pino and Manuel Chaves led a force
of about 400 into the Navaho country in the spring. Another
party of about fifty suffered heavy losses in a fight with the
Indians near Laguna Grande in July. Ramon Baca arrived
the next day with 300 men and turned the tables on the
victors. 57 Other people agitated for a regiment of volunteers.
Governor Rencher was unsympathetic toward this move because he thought that there were sufficient troops for a campaign and,furthermore, volunteers would not be paid by the
government unless the department commander called for
such aid. But he did offer to accede to public opinion 'if the
people would pay the expenses of the regiment.
Fauntleroy, of course, was opposed to such aid unless
under federal control, but th~move for local action was not
ended; "Urged on by a few ambitious or interested leaders ... ," a public meeting on August 27 resolved to take the
matter "into their own hailds."58 As a result, forces were
raised and moved against the Indians. Secretary of War
Cass suggested that they be prosecuted for violation of the
law, but Rencher thought that such a course was practically
impossible and believed that the remedy lay in orders from
the proper department in Washington: "But for a few interested speculators;' backed by some federal officers, these
unauthorized expeditions would never, in my opinion, have
been organized; because,in the ,main, the Mexicans are a
law abiding people." 59
Collins was one of the "federal officers." His sub-agent
at Abiquiu, AlbertH. Pfeiffer, led a party of Mexicans and
Ute Indians against the Navaho, captured some stock and
tooka number of captives. The superintendent also changed
his mind about authorizing the use of the Ute as auxiliaries
for the regular troops. This was due to several reasons. His
efforts at promoting peace between the two tribes had not
57.

Gazette. 7/18/60, in C640/60.
Rencher to Cass, 9/4/60, 36 Congo 2 sess. Hse. Ex. Doc. 24, VI, 12-13 (1097),
and Rencher, Address to Public, 8/20/60,.,
59. Rencher to Casso 11/10/60. ibid•• p. 16.

58.
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met with success, and they were now fighting. Furthermore,
he was still seeking that will-o'-the-wisp, a decisive campaign.
Since the regular troops moved slowiy, and the season was
already advanced, he hoped that the Ute would hasten matters and secure the desired end. He .was still conscious of
his' d::ty to promote the welfare of his charges, but sometimes one more straw will break the camel's back: "I have
to a great degree lost all sympathy for them and look forward to their thorough chastisement as our only relief from
their incursions." . If well punished, he thought the Navaho
would then be more amenable to adopting the ways of the
civilized white man. To make this more certain, the last
resource of the Territory was drawn upon, the Pueblo Indians were enlisted. 60
Despite the large preparations made to chastise the
Navaho, the campaign proved as indecisive as the previous
.ones. With the approach of winter, an armistice was arranged and the troops were withdrawn from the field. The
non-aggressive Navaho submitted unconditionally and promised to make war on the ladrones, to remain west of Fort
Fauntleroy, and as soon as practicable to locate in settled
communities. To test the sincerity of the Indians, Fauntleroy admonished the public to make no further attacks
-during the armistice. 61 .
The armistice and the desire of Fauntleroy were equally
futile in ending the difficulties. The formal cessati9n of hostilities was continued in effect all during the year 1861 be-·
cause of the uncertainty of conditions arising from the outbreak of the Civil War. 62 But illegal attacks were made on
the Indians and they retaliated by raiding the settlements,
or perhaps vice versa: Both sides claimed the other had
. broken the peace agreement. It was impossible t6'fixspecific
responsibility because the trouble makers were the few on
each side and their suppressIon constituted the crux of the
60.

62.

Collins, A ......

Collins to Greenwood, 9/8/60, C733/60, and 9/16/60, C741/60.

nual Report, 9/24/60, 36 Congo 2 sess. S~n. Ex. Doc. 1, I, 383 (1078).
61. Fauntleroy to Rencher, 2/27/61, in Gazette, C991/61.
Collins to Dole, 9/7/61, C1358/61.
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problem. If the ladrones could be controlled by the peace
party among the Navaho, and popular opinion with the aid
of authority could stop the plundering expeditions of the
settlers, the two races would be at peace.
During this period of official inactivity, the sentiment in
favor of drastic and decisive action grew. The new territorial governor, Henry Connelly, expressed himself
strongly: despite the efforts of Spain, Mexico, and the
United States the Indians "yet remain the same enemies to
God and to man, to civilization and peaceful industry which
they were found to be when first brought into contact with
cp.ristian c()mmunities.'" He criticised ,the go~ernment for
its inaction based on "prevalence of a sickly sentimentality
-a false philanthropy-in the mind of the people of the
more populous States now secured from Indian contact and
depredation ... ," and recommended that the government
use its power to restrict the Indians within proper limits
and either maintain them as paupers, teach them
the arts of civilized life, and oblige them to sustain
themselves, or on the other hand exterminate them.
The earth was given to man so that by the sweat of
his brow he should draw subsistence therefrom.
Such is the Divine command, and those who obey it
not, must taste of the bitter fruits of disobedience.
Under this injunction the Indians has rights as
well as the civilized portion of mankind. 63
The department commander was in agreement with the
governor, but was inclined to place a bit more of the responsibility for the situation 'on the shoulders of 'the people. It
was their moral'responsibility, he believed, to put an end to
marauding expeditions and thereby make more possible a
satisfactory solution to the problem. But perhaps that possi~
bility had already passed:
Recent occurrences in the Navajo country ...
have so demoralized and broken up that nation, that
there is now no choice between their absolute extermination or their removal and colonization at

---63. Henry Connelly, 12/4/61, Executi",. Records, 1851-1867,

p. 281.
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points so remote from the settlements as to isolate
them entirely from the inhabitants of the
Territor~.64

The plan of' establishing fixed boundaries for the
,Navaho was provided for in the treaty of 1858, but now the
idea of removal had been advanced. And as the plan for
collective responsibility had broken down, ,an attempt was
now to be made to distinguish between the peaceful Navaho
and tl).e ladrones. The troublemakers were marked out for
definite punishment just as soon as the military could find
the opportu'nity.65
On this basis the situatioI,1 continued unchanged duringthe spring and summer of 1862. The military were too occupied with the Texan invasion to do more than try to catch
Indian marauders before they could escape to their mountain
fastnesses with their plunder. 66 But with the arrival of a
new commander in the department, strong and drastic
measures were adopted that were to prove the ultimate
solution of the Navaho problem.
64. Canby to A. A. G., 12/1/61, R. R. Series I, vol. 4, p. 77.
Canby apparently referred to a fight that occurred at Fort Fauntleroy in September, 1861. The post offi~ers and the Navaho staged a horse race, a dispute arose Over
the outcome and a fight resulted.
Colonel W. W. Loring had assumed command of the Department of New Mexico,
March 3, 1861. He resigned and left Santa Fe, June 11, leaving Major E. R. S. Canby
in charge. Ibid., Series I, vol. 1, p. 599,606.
65. Canby to Connelly, 11/22/61, R. R., Series I, vol. 4, p. 75-76.
66. Under the territorial law of January 13, 1859, the Justice' of the Peace was
required to report. Indian depredations to the Probate Judge, who in turn reported to
the Territorial Assembly. New. Mexico, Revised Statutes, 1865.
For the year 1862 the depredations reported from nine counties were as follows:
62 persons killed, 34 wounded, 7 captured; stock stolen, 684 horses, 2,599 cattle, 254
mules, 30,841 sheep, 974 burros, 32 other animals; total cost $340,405.17. New Mexico
Legislative Assembly, House Journal, 1863, p. 185.
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CHAPTER II
THE CARLETON POLICY
RIGADIER-GENERAL James H. Carleton succeeded Canby as

B commander of the Department of New Mexico, September 18, 1862, and he soon laid plans to solve the Indian problem. Because of the limited military resources, the tribes
were dealt with one at a time. The Mescaleros were the first
to feel his hard hand; the majority of them being subdued by
the end of the year and removed to Fort Sumner. The neXt
in order were the Navaho. In preparation for their chastisement, Fort Wingate was established in the spdng in accordance with the plan of Fauntleroy.
.
These measures moved a group of eighteen Navaho
chiefs to visit Santa Fe. In the meeting that resulted, Carleton explained his policy in no uncertain terms:
I told them that they could have no peace until
they would give other guarantees than their word
that the peace should be kept; to go home and tell
their people so; that we had no faith in their promises; that if they did not return we should know
they had chosen the alterp.ative of war; that in this
event the consequences rested on them. 2
The pith of the statement lay in the phrase, "other guarantees than their word.". The futility of treaties was thus recognized and some other method was to be employed to control the nomad; but meanwhile, war was considered a necessary preliminary: .
It may be set down as a rule that the 'Navajo
Indians have long since passed that point when
talking would be of any avail. They must be
whipped and fear us before they will cease killing
and robbing the people.3
1.
Weekly
2.
3.
"It

Carleton to Col. J. F. Chaves, 10/12/62, A. G. 0., LS 13, p. 4. Rio Abejo
Press, 4/28/63, 6/23163.
Carleton to Thomas, 12/20/62, J. S. C., 1867, p. 103.
Carleton to· Brig. Gen. Lorenzo Thomas, 2/1/63, R. R. Ser. I, vol. 15, p. 670.
would be difficult to tell what means had not been tried in the process [of sub-
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This s.entiment was concurred in by the Indian bureau and
the territorial executive.
Late in the spring of 1863, the policy of Carleton had
begun to take more definite shape. .The friendly Navaho
were to be separated from the unfriendly. Those who wanted
. peace were to be sent to the Bosque Redondo, where they .
would be protected until the war was over. By September
his plan was fully formulated; the "other guarantee" had
been decided upon. The· Bosque Redondo was to be the
permanent abode of the whole Navaho nation; the reservation policy was to be put into force qn a grand scale:
The purpose I have in view is to send all cap..:
tured Navajoes and Apaches to that point [Bosque
. Redondo], and there to feed and take care of them
until they have opened farms and become able to
support themselves, as the Pueblo Indians of New.
Mexico are doing. Removal should be the "sine
qua non" of peace.
.
The knowledge of the perfidy of these Navajoes, gained after two centuries of experience, is
such as to lead us to put no faith in their promises.
They have no government to make treaties; they
are a patriarchal people. One set of families may
make promises, but the other set will not heed them.
. They understand the direct application of force as .
a law, if its application be removed that moment
they become lawless. This has been trij:!d over and
over again, and at great expense. The purpose
now is, never to relax the application of force with
a people that can no more be trusted than the wolves
that run through the mountains. To collect them
together, little by little, on to a reservation, away
from the haunts, and hills, and hiding places of
their country; there be kind to them; there teach
their children how to read and write; teach them
the arts of peace; teach them the truth of Christianity. Soon they will acquire new habits, new
duing the Navajoes]; there were fighting, feeding, coaxing, arguments, presents, and
treaties, until money, argument and patience were equally exhausted, and a ~N8vajo
treaty' had pasBed into the same category of intangibles with 'Punic faith'-bEicame a
byword and a joke.!' George Gwyther, "An Indian Reservation," in Overland Monthly.
X, 124 (Feb., 1873). Gwyther was an army medical officer, stationed at Fort Sumner.

250

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW
ideas, and new modes of life; and the old Indians
will die off, and carry with them all latent longings
for murdering and robbing.... Even until they can
raise enough to be self-sustaining, you can feed
them chea,per than you can fidht them.
You will observe that the Bosque Redondo is
far down the Pecos, on the open plains, where the
Indians can have no lateral contract [contact]
with settlers. If the government will only set apart
a reservation of forty miles square, with Fort Sumner, at the Bosque Redondo, in the centre, all the
good land will be covered, and keep the settlers a
proper distance from the Indians. There is no place
in the Navajo country fit for a reservation; and
even if there were, it would not be wise to have it
there, for in a short time the Indians would steal
away into their. mountain fastnesses again, and
then, as of.old, would come a new war, and so on
'ad infinitum.
I know these views ar~ practical and humane
-are just to the suffering people, as well as to the
aggres~ive, perfidious, butchering Navajoes. 4 ·

Carleton might have added, as he did the following year,
that his decision to remove the Navaho from their mountain
fastnesses was strengthened by the mining development in
Arizona. }>rospectors were invading the region north of
the Gila river arid "the fact that every stream coming from
it is known to be-gold bearing"5 justified the location of Fort
Whipple in the fall of 1863 to protect the miners. With the
removal of the Navaho from the immediate vicinity Of the
route along the 35th parallel, the road to the mining region
would be safe, and an influx of miners would follow. On the
assumption that Arizona .would remain primarily a mining
region and New Mexico would continue as a stock raising
country, the new territory would constitute a market for
the products of New Mexico. Furthermore, with the' route
to the west safe, stage lines and a railroad would be con4.
5.

'Carleton to Thomas, 9/6/63, 38 Congo 1 sess. Hse. Ex. Doc. 1, III, 230, (1182).
Allyn to Carleton, 4/7/64, Gazette, 6/4/64.
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structed hecause of the superior all-year climate in the southwest for transcontinental travel. 6
The Navaho, of course, did not take kindly to the idea
. that Carleton had in mind. In a conference held at Cubero
about May 1, he informed the chiefs, Delgadlto and Barbonciito, of the plan for removal of the friendly members of the
tribe. Barboncito not only refused to go, but also refused to
fight if attacked. But as Colonel Chaves laconically wrote,
"when it comes to the pinch he will fight run or go to Bosque
Redondo." 7 And they soon had to make their choice, because Colonel Christopher Carson was ordered on June 15
to establish Fort Canby at the Pueblo Colorado and prosecute
the war. The peaceful Navaho were given until July 20 to
surrender voluntarily and go to their new home. 8
Carson took the field in August with a force of v'olunteers. Their zeal was stimulated by the offer of $20 prize
money for every horse or mule captured from those who did
not voluntarily surrender, and of· $1 per head for sheep.
This was displeasing to the Indian service officials, but
Carleton was working for a definite solution of -the problem,
and confiscation of enemy supplies is a legitimate weapon of
war. Whatever could not be taken by the troops was destroyed, especially the corn fields and peach orchards. In
one other respect, a change was made in the traditional
methods of fighting. Captive children taken by the Ute
Indians could not be sold to the Mexicans to be held in
slavery ; all prisoners were to be sent to the Bosque Re'dondo. 9
The results of the campaign appeared slowly at first.
During the late summer and fall, scouts accomplished little
except destruction of property, the killing of a few Indians,
6. Carleton to the people of New Mexico, 12/16/64, Gazette, 1/21/65. Ibid.,
6/11/64, 7/2/64.
"It is well known that the principal actor'in the farce [the Bosque Redondo], and
many of the advocates, are largely interested in mines in Arizona." The New
Mexican, 10/28/64. This 'newspaper was anti-Carleton; the Gazette was pro-Carleton.
7. Chavez to Collins, 5/4/63, C264/63. Chavez was commander at Fort Wingate.
8. Carleton to Chaves and Carson; 6/23/63, S. J. C., p. 116, 245.
, 9. Carleton to Carson, 8/18/63, R. R., Ser. i, pt. I, vol. 26, p.235. Dole to Usher,
12/23/63, RB 13, p. 267.
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and the gaining of a more detailed knowledge of the country.
However, a party of fifty-one from the peaceful Sandoval
band was sent to the Bosque Redondo in September, and Delgadito with another party of 188 joined them in November.
But the winter months were to produce the decisive results.
Whereas former commanders had withdrawn the troops
from the field at the approach of bad weather, Carleton was
not to be deterred by any such obstacle. In August he had
advised Carson that "The value of time cannot be too seriously considered. Make every sting draw. .Much is expected of you, .both here and in Washington." 10 When the
Indians ran off part of the mule herd of the troops, in December, the instructions were not to delay the planned expedition for Canyon de Chelly: "Now, while the snow is deep,"
was the time to strike. If the troops were not willing to
suffer privations, such as campaigning on foot in winter
with three or four days rations and blankets, the Indians
would get the best of the contestP
. Carson was a worthy field-commander for a chief like
Carleton. As early as October he recognized that a winter
campaign on foot would be necessary, because the horses
could not endure the severe work. And a month later he
wrote, "I will venture to assert that no troops of the United
States have ever before been called upon to endure as many
hardships as did the men of my command" on a scout west
of the Oraibi villages. i2 This statement might sound a bit
boastful; but it was no boy's play that had" been entered
upon. 13
10. 8/7/63, A. G. 0., LS 13, 'p. 630.
11. Carleton to Carson, 12/31/63, S. J. C., p. 154.
12. Carson to Cutler, 12/6/63, R. R., Ser. I, pt. 1, vol. 26, p. 255.
13. "His scout to the unexplored country west of Little Red River [Little Colorado], is unparalleled in indian or civilized warfare, and no other detachment of U. S.
troops has encountered and overcome such hardships during the present war. Imagine
a detachment of four hundred men leaving a post in winter on a twenty days' scout,
the snow fifteen inches deep and still faIling fast, their pack mules giving out one by
one, and the companies obliged in consequence to cache most of their rations, and the
commander under these circumstances still pushing forward in defiance of all the difficulties which beset him. And, furthermore. in defiance of the very elements combined,
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Come dress your ranks, my gallant souls, a standing in a row,
Kit Carson he is waiting to march against the foe;
At night we march to, Moqui, o'er lofty hills of
snow,
To meet a,nd crush the savage foe, bold Johnny
Navajo.
We'll first chastise, then civilize bold Johnny
Navajo!
,
Johnny Navajo! 0 Johnny Navajo!14
Carson led his force to the Canyon de Chelly in January,
1864, and his aids, Albert H. Pfeiffer and Asa Carey, penetrated its defiles. This venture into the very heart of the
hostiles' country produced the desired results; they now'
surrendered in large numbers. In early March, Captain
John Thompson left Fort Canby with 2,138 captives, including chief Herrera, for the Bosque Redondo.I 5 Strenuous
field operations were suspended for a few months to await
the full effect of the winter campaign.
During theJ).ext three years a complex policy of scduts,
peaceful interviews, and the use of friendly emissaries from
the captives at the Bosque Redondo was followed in' an at- .
tempt to induce the wilful Navaho to ·surrender. Threats
and cajolery were employed with varying success. The stubborness of old Barboncito was duplicated by Manuelito. They
were both captured once only to escape. But in 1866 they
14. Rio Abajo Weekly Press. 12/8/63.
15. Carey to Cutler, 3/6/64, R. R., Ser. Ii pt. I, vol. 34, p. 118. Rio Abajo Weekly
Press, 3/22/64.
. '
he presses forward, his men marching sixty-two miles with a halt of but two hours for.
rest." Tara to Editor, 1/9/64, Rio Abajo Weekly Press, 2/2/64.
"Long marches on foot over desert, arid wastes; climbing almost perpendicular
mountains, carrying on the shoulder blanket, rations and accoutrements; shivering on
the night march though ready to falI from fatigue; lying on the cold ground protected
by one blanket (generalIy of the shoddy regimen), from a temperature where the mercury felI to 40° below zero; where the cheerful glare and the brightening i";f!uences of
the bivouac fire were forbidden lest the enemy know of their whereabouts; where the
frost was so intense that hardy resolute men groaned with the pain from it; where
feet, hands, ears, and noses were frozen; where old mountaineers, such as Colonel Car..
Bon,averred, as he. did in the writer's presence, the cold to be more intense and the
sufl'erings greater than any known to his great experience." G. to Editor, 2/15/64.
Ibid., 2/23/64.
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were finally taken and sent to live with their people on the
Pecos. Manuelito surrendered in September, and Barboncito gave up the strilggle in November. The odds were too
great. They could elude the troops by their knowledge of
the country, but as their means of livelihood were gradually
whittled away, starvation ended their resistance.
The uprooting of this powerful tribe from its native
haunts, and the transplanting in a new environment, was
accomplished only at the cost of much suffering and some
loss of life. No doubt many of the Navaho had lived at peace
with their white neighbors and were willing to continue in
that relationship. Although the ladrones had been the
trouble-makers, all were subjected to the same treatment.
Their emotional reactions were those of human beings.
Manuelito, a magnificent specimen of physical manhood, accepted ·his fate with the courage of a war chief. 16 Others,
with less understanding of why they were being so treated,
shed tears on meeting with their friends at the Bosque ]1edondo. Hungry, tired, and weary, some responded to the
kind treatment of their captors with demonstrations of good
feeling and gratitude, others with sullen hatred. And their
suffering had been great: "The,irgaunt, famished looks told
their story plain enough." However, no searing memory of
those times has remained,17
Despite the strenuous efforts of Carleton, the Navaho
were never completely rounded up. The estimates of the
number at large varied from 300 to 3,000, the size of the
figure being partly dependent on the attitude of the estimator
toward the policy that had been adopted. The highest num16. See John C. Ceremony, "Some Savages," in Overland Monthly, VIII, 201-210
(March, 1872).
.
17. James F. Meline, Two Thousand Miles on Horseback, P. 127. Hester Jones,
Report on Historical Investigation at Crown Point. August, 1933.
"It seemed like the exodus of the Israelites, only that the spoiler and not the spoiled
were departing, to watch this large body of men, women and children, in very primitive
costume. or mere bundles of rags, with such household goods of blankets, pots and
kettles as they could carry, and driving all the live-stock of horses, goats and sheep that
the campaign had left to a few of them, winding their way through the narrow valleys
leading from Wingate to the Rio Grande. . . ." Gwyther. HAn Indian Reservation,U in
Overland Monthly, X, 127 (Feb. 1873).
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ber reported at the Bosque Redondo was in the month of
January, 1865, when 8,557 were counted. This number had
dwindled to 6,236 by the end of the year. But the figures
were never accurate. Some of the prisoners might be absent
on the day of the count because of illness, because they were
herding the stock, or because they had deserted from the
reservation. ls But except for an occasional minor escapade
in the course of the next few years, the Navaho scourge had
been ended, and a new life opened before them on the banks
of the Pecos.
The Bosque Redondo, an area forty miles square surrounding Fort Sumner,19 had been approved by President
Lincoln as a reservation for the Apache, January 15, 1864.
The name was derived from the cottonwood trees that dotted
the river for six or seven miles, mostly on the left bank. The
stream had long completed its main geological task imd was
now in the lazy stage of life, meandering slowly down a valley which was about two miles wide midway of the Bosque.
This favorable part of the reservation embraced approximately 4,000 acres of irrigable land. Another 2,000 acres
could be found in the whole area. The minerals in the river
water were very distasteful to some people. The mesa land,
rich in grass for sheep and cattle, and with abundant fuel.in
the mesquite, but woefully lacking in timber, stretched away
into the distance, east and west. The nearest settlement was
located about forty-five miles to the north. 20
When the great experiment of civilizing the Navaho was
started with the arrival of the first group at their new home
in September, 1863, a discordant note developed in the rela, tions between the milita~y and civil offiCials which laid the
18. Official Report, January, 1865, C1306/65 and 188/66.
uHc;>w many are left among the mountain fastnesses of their old home, it is impos..
sible to tell. The number, however, must be very small." Mix to Browning, 1/15/68.
RB 17, p. 95.
, '19. Kappler, I, 870.
20. Captain Thomas Claiborne to Wilkins, ,8/9/59, 36 Congo 1 sess. Sen. Ex. Doc.
2, II, 329 (1024). John A. Clark to Steck, 10/21/63, and Steck to Dole, 12/10/63,
S214%/63.
Carleton was familiar with this location, having visited it in 1852, 1854, and again
in the spring of 1863. Gazette. 1/21/65.
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foundation for chronic uncertainty about the future of the
reservation. An earlier blow at the success of the plan had
been· dealt by the removal of Superintendent Collins from
office in the spring of 1863.21 He had heartily supported the
policy of the commander, but his successor, Michael Steck,
had other views on the matter and proceeded to put them
into effect promptly. He instructed Agent Labadie not to
take charge of the Navaho on the grounds that they were
prisoners of war and that he had no funds to subsist them. 22
The first of the two reasons was a·narrowtechnicality which
should not have been advanced in this time of need. With
an approach to a solution of the Navaho problem along lines
essentially favored by the majority of officials in the past,
namely, location on a reservation removed from the settlements where the Indians could be civilized, the superintendent was adopting an obstructive policy. It was true that
the finances of the Indian service would not bear the strain
of feeding several thousand souls, but doubtless Carleton
would have thrown the resources of the quartermaster's department into the breach. In view of his determination to
make a success of the Bosque Redondo experiment, it is inconceivable that he would have calmly washed his hands of
all responsibility after turning the prisoners over to the civil
officiais.
But Steck's oppositi~n was also based on broader
grounds. He believed that the proposed reservation was
an excellent location for a limited number of Indians, and
that· it would ·suffice for the estimated number of about
2,500 Apache; but to locate the Navaho there also was impossible. There was insufficient land for both tribes, and to
manage two such powerful groups on one reservation was
too difficult. The hereditary feud of the Apache and Navaho
could not be ironed out, he believed. Furthermore, ~he
21. See below, Chapter V.
22. Steck to Labadi, 9/5/63, W300/64. Steck to Carleton, 9/6/63, S245/64.
CollinB had even fa~ored reBtoring to the department of war the control of· the
IndianB aB the best way of Becuring cooperation between the military and civil officialB
which he considered essential for the success of Indian management. Annual Report,
9/27/58; 35 Congo 2 BeBB. Sen. Ex. Doc. I, I, 539 (974).
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forty-miles square area would not provide sufficient grazing
ground for the Navaho flocks of sheep and herds of horses.
And to remove that tribe some 300 miles across country
would be a long and costly operation. 23 He recommended;
therefore, that the Navaho be located on the Little Colorado
in western New Mexico.
Commissioner Dole supported the superintendent in his
stand, although he did confess that if funds were available
he would be willing to overlook the technicality about "prisoners of war." He recommended to the secretary of the interior that the department of war be requested to instruct
Carleton to feed the Navaho until they were returned to the
control of the Indian bureau, and that a commissioner be
, appointed' to examine the valley of the Little Colorado ,for a
suitable site for a reservation. 24
Steck continued in his opposition to the location of the
Navaho on the Pecos by refusing to lend any aid, and by
forwarding unfavorable reports to Washington. With the
temporary cessation of hostilities in the spring, he dispatched Agent Ward to make contact with and to render
service to the members of the tribe still at large, even though
the milibtry had requested that the agent be sent to the
Bosque Redondo. He acquiesced in a temporary location of
the Navaho with the Apache, but urged speed in the proposed surveyor the Little Colorado site. He noted with
satisfaction that a board of army officers reported the cost
of the Carleton undertaking was $510,000,' for the four
, months from March to June, 1864. ' Adding to this figure the
cost of transportation to Fort Sumner, buildings erected,
men and teams employed, he calculated the actual cost of that
short period was closer to $700,000. A proposed ~ommission
to visit the Navaho was frowned upon as a scheme to get
control of the contracts for feeding the prisoners. The stories
23. Steck to Dole, 12/10/63, S214 1/2-63. Two months before this letter he expressed the desire to collect the Apache at Fort Stanton, Steck to Dole, 10/10/03,
SI81/63.
24. Dole to Steck, 2/2/64, LB 73, p. 113. Dole to Usher, 2/1/64, RB 13, p. 294.
Dole to Usher, 3/4/64, RB 13, p. 327.
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of depredations by those who still remained at large were
noted and the opinion advanced that a large part of the
nation was still roaming the old range. The freeing of those
at the Bosque Redondo would be cheaper than to persevere
in the attempt to capture the rest. The thorough thrashing
would produce a permanent peace, and the Navaho could be
made self-sufficing at home with much less trouble and
expense. 25
Support was not wanting for Steck's position. Some
of the citizens of San Miguel and Mora counties, smarting
under the removal of the Ute agency to Cimarron, looked
with disfavor on the location of seven or eight thousand
more savages nearby. They feared unnecessarily the loss
of grazing grounds in competition with the Indians, arid
further annoyance through depredations similar to those
committed by the northern Indians. 26 Nor were the people
of the Rio Abajo wholly enthusiastic over the change because Indians were not looked upon as an unmixed blessing:
therefore, why locate the whole tribe in New Mexico? If located on the Pecos, they would constitute another Indian
barrier to communications with the East. But to those who
were engaged in the freighting of goods and trading to the
Navaho country the change in location would mean a loss of
business; they, naturally, opposed the migration. Certainly
Carleton believed that that motive played a part:
There can 'hardly be a doubt but that here are'
a set of demagogues who foresee that when the Indians are all colonized there will be no further need
of the immense expenditures which have hitherto
been incurred in keeping troops in New Mexico, and
make that one of the points to oppose so important
a measure. It is well to remember the machina26, 8teck to Dole, 2/16/64, 8264/64; and 4/11/64, 8330/64; 5/20/64, 8372/64;
5/28/64, 8382/64; 6/20/64, 8404/64; 6/25/64, 8406/64.
'
26. Probate Judge Miguel Romero y Baca to 8teck, 6/23/64, 8429/64. The New
Mexican, 1/27/66.
James M. Giddings of Agua Negra charged that the opposition in these two connties originated. in the Rio Abaio for political reasous. The New Mexico Press, 10/4/64,
in 8510/64.
8ee Gazette, 9/24/64, 10/1/64, 7/2/65. The New Mexican, 1/27/65.
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tionsof parties to keep up the Florida war. In my
opinion, this idea of losing the Government patronage for 'New Mexico when the Indian difficulties
should come to an end with a certain set who care
nothing for the poor or for the future of the country
is one great element of opposition to the measure. 27
A voice of protest was even heard from far-away Las Cruces
in a communication to The New Mexican: You and Romero
y Baca "do that lazaroni colony-'Sweet Carletonia'-the
amplest justice. 'The colony' is a stupendous humbug."28
Former Superintendent Collins and others rose to the
defense of Carleton. He contended that the Little Colorado
was not a proper place for a reservation because the soil was
not suitable, the pasture was not good, and the location lay
on the route to Arizona and California. The greater distance
from the settlement would add greatly to the cost of transportation,29 a fact which counted heavily with Carleton: "If
those who wish them moved will name the place west of the
Rio Grande where they would put them I will measure the
distances, survey the ground, get bids for freight, calculate
the cost of the forts, the number and cost of the various garrisons, the cost of food, and prove by positive data" that it
will cost three times asmuch as to keep them where they are.
"You had better by far move them to Kansas or Missouri,
for then you take them where provisions are cheap." 30 Governor Connelly and the territorial legislature were sympathetic toward the general, but individual sniping with political bias partly off-set such support. Senator Harry Wilson
at Washington was requested to "send us a true republican
and honest man" because "Six or seven millions is to much
patronage to be placed in even doubtful hands." The letter
27. Carleton to A. G., 1/17/65, R. R., Ser. I, vol. 48, pt. 1, P. 569. Rio Abajo
Weekly Press, 4/12/64, 9/13/64.
28. X. Y. Z. to Editors, 9/9/64, in an issue of 9/23/64.
29. Collins to Dole, 7/18/64, C945/64.
Captain H. M. Enos reported, February 15, 1864, that the water in the Colorado
Chiquito (the Little Colorado) was brackish, there was abundant grass of poor quality
along the valley. and the bottoms were impossible in wet weather for heavy wagons.,
Gazette, 7/2/64.
.
30. Carleton to A. G., 1/17/65, R. R., Ser. I, vol. 48, pt. 1, p. 569.
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. was referred to Secretary of War Stanton for serious
consideration. 31
- While the conflict over policy was raging, Carleton was
faced with the immediate problem of providing for the
prisoners. They need food, clothing, and shelter. Many of
them had arrived at the Bosque Redondo practically naked.
There was precedent in the military department for feeding
Indians in an emergency, but the issuance of clothing was
another matter. He requested authorization from Washington to draw on the quartermaster's department and adopted
temporary measures on his own responsibility; The party
that arrived in December, 1863, were "comfortably quartered in old Sibley tents, and ... had their sick cared for by
the attending surgeon. Many of the little ones required
medical treatment." As a final solution he recommended
that the government grant an annuity to the Navaho of
$150,000 annually in goods, for ten years. Connelly wrote
to Stanton urging the same course, and· Collins was dispatched to Washington in March as' a special emissary to
speed action. 32 Meanwhile, the general was determined to
carryon: "These Indians are upon my hands. They must be
clothed and fed until they can clothe and feed themselves.
I will not turn them loose again to war upon the people, and
cannot see them perish either from nakedness or hunger."33
In this time of emergency the troops were put on half rations
until a temporary shortage in food stuffs was ended.
Under the pressure for funds, .congress appropriated
$100,000 for subsistence and farm implements, June 6, 1864.
William B. Baker and Colonel J. H. Leavenworth were"commissioned to expend the money. They were allowed $10,000 for expenses and for small purchases inconvenient to
keep invoice records of. The goods could be purchased in
31. H. S. Bowman to Senator Harry Wilson, 1/12/65, W505/65.
32. Major H. D. Wallen to Carleton, 12/11/63, R. R., Ser. I, pt. I, vol. 26, p.
844-45. Carleton to Thomas, 12/12/63, W301/64. Henry Connelly to Edwin M.
Stanton, 2/12/64, W409/64.
Stanton recommended an appropriation of $100,000, 3/31/64. Congo Glohe, 38
Congo 1sess., pt. 3, p. 2172.
33. Carleton to Thomas, 3/6/64, 38 Congo 1sess. Hse. Ex. Doc. 70, XIII, 6 (1193).
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open market, either in the East or the West, because of the
lateness of the season and the need for haste, a need that
. Carleton had made clear : "Let me impress upon your [Dole]
mind that unless they come hundreds of naked women and
.children will be likely to perish... 'A special train of wagons
escorted by a company of troops can come through at all
seasons." With about 8,000 Indians on his hands "almost
entirely destitute of clothing and blankets," and cold weather
approaching, his anxiety can well be understood. 34
The two commissioners displayed a sad lack of the spirit
of cooperation. Leavenworth proceeded to make the purchases at Leavenworth, Kansas, with little regard for Baker.
But after the train was under way, he let responsibility for
its successful arrival at Fort Union devolve upon his' colleague. Furthermore, his handling of the funds was not
above reproach; Baker, consequently, denounced him to the
Washington office on the grounds of dishonesty. In writing'
to Secretary I. P. Usher he remarked, "you will very naturally ask why, in view of what I have written, these cheatings
were permitted by me? . Well, my dear Sir, I, had some
adroit fellows to deal with ..."35,
The goods finally reached Fort Sumner and were dist:r:ibuted about Christmas time. A board of two army officers,
witnessed the distribution carried out under the supervision,
of Steck. They were highly critical of the nature of the pur- .
chases. Blankets pought at 3: price of $18.50 per pair were
of poorer quality than army blankets purchased for $5.85.
The total value of the goods was figured at about $30,000.
And, to mak~ matters worse, many of the Indians received
nothing. ' Baker wrote that "The distribution presented an
,
I

34. Carleton to Dole, 9/16/64. C1062/64. Dole to Leavenworth, 7/27/64,' LB 75,
p. 8; see also p. 12, 17, 103.
35. 1/15/65, B1180/65.
Dole, Leavenworth, and Carney & Stevens Co. of Leavenworth, Kansas, made
$25,000 excess profit on this deal. Baker to H. T. Blow, 6/30/66, B180/66.
"that he [Baker] done all he COUld, from malic" or ignorance to entangle.the business, is plainly to be seen." Leavenworth'to Cooley, 9/6/66, L218/66.
Mr. Cooley, late commissioner, when taking office compromised with creditors for
i5c per $1. 'He now has $30,000 in the bank. Leavenworth Conservative, 3/21/67, in

Gaz!,tte, 4/6/67.
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interesting scene, and if those who had grabbed no inconsiderable portion of the fund had witnessed it, I sincerely
believe that conscience would have twinged them right
sharply." 36
Although the government was looked to for support
during the period of emergency, the ultimate aim was to
make the Indian self-sufficing. With extreme optimism,
Carleton believed that the transition period would be short.
Plans were laid for planting thousands of trees against the
time when the mesquite would fail as a source of fuel, and
crops were planted by the Navaho in the spring of 1864 to
provide a food supply for the next winter. But these efforts
were met by the opposition of unruly nature. 'The, three
thousand acres under cultivation might have solved the food
problem; but, unfortunately insects destroyed most of the
crop.
Brigadier-General M. M. Crocker was detailed to command at Fort Sumner,' September 9, 1864. He was instructed
to allot lands in severalty, choose village sites for the various
bands, practice economy and exercise "patience, kindness,
moderation, justice, and firmness."37 The new commandant
viewed the situation through rosy glasses. The Bosque Redondo was the richest valley that he had seen in the Territory, and he estimated that 9,000 acres 38 .would be ready for
planting in the next season. The crops would not only suffice
36. Baker to Usher, 1/15/65,B1180/65. Report of militarY board 12/26/64,
8607/65.
,
"I was present dUring' the examination of these goods, and 'carefully noted the expressions of astonishment and disgust which permeated the speech and visages of the
members of the board during the investigation. No language can do justice to the
ingenuit~ with which some parties had managed to relieve their stores of a large
quantity of rusty. old-fashioned, unserviceable, and unsalable plows, soft-iron spades,
rakes and hoes, knives and hatchets, coarse, gaudy calicoes and muslin, and thin,
flimsy, shoddy cloths and blankets. I particularly recollect the blankets, because I took
one pair of them to the scales, and by accurate weight found they weighed 4'fa Ibs,;
and as a single government blanket, such as is issued to troops, weighs 5'fa Ibs., and
costs $4.50, the reader can judge of the honesty of an invoice which charged $22 per
pair for such articles." The post-sutler estimated their value at about $30,000 "out
here." GWyther, "An Indian Reservation," in OVBrmnd Monthly, X, 129 (Feb. 1873).
37. Special orders No. 37, R. R., 8er. I, pt. 3, vol. 41, p. 261.
38.' By act of Congress, 6/30/64, the reservation was extended to the southward
to include an area known as the Bosque Grande, and the whole was termed "the Navajoe
,and Apache reservation." U. S. L., XIII, 323.
','
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to feed the Indians, but a surplus would exist and could be
used for the support of the troops at the post. The Indians
"work cheerfully, are docile, polite, and' well disposed ....
I am quite sure that I have never witnessed in any community such universal content and general hopefulness." He
recommended that Captain Calloway be appointed as a practical farmer in charge of supervising the work of the
prisoners. 39 .
But the mind of Carleton was not at ease. A favorable
report by Carson in July and the optimistic view of Crocker
in September could not lead him to remove his hand far
from the helm. Instructions were constantly forwarded in
regard to details of management. If the spirit of one man
can be instilled into another by the written word, the soul
of Carleton certainly ranged in the hearts of his subordinates. With anxiety, and with courage, he watched over
every step taken and urged on his helpers:

./

You must pardon me for suggesting all these
details, but my anxiety is so great to make this powerful nation which has surrendered to us as happy
and as well cared for as possible, under all the adverse circumstances which encompass us, that
every idea looking to this end which comes into my
mind I send to you, fully believing that' you will
enter into the spirit that animates me for their
good. The [greatest] economy in the use of food
in· all things must be observed. The making of
soups, which is by far the best way in which to
cook what they have, must be inculcated as a religion.
Tell them to be too proud to murmur at what
cannot be helped. We could not forsee the total
destruction of their corn crop, nor could we foresee
39. Crocker to A. A. G., 9/28/64, Cl118/64.
UThe adverse measures [see note No. 36] were not;. however, affecting our proteges
very seriously;' they sang and danced, fed and worked, as usual-no commOunity could
be happier; and were so highly contented, that, in a short time, several individual requests were made, and acceded to by those in authority. for permission to pay a visit
to their old homes, for the purpose of persuading some of their relatives, who still hid
there, to join them on the reserve." Gwyther, "An Indian Reservation, in Overland
Monthly, X, 129 (Feb. 1873).
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that the frost and hail would come and destroy the
crop in the country, qut not to be discouraged; to
work hard, every man and woman, to put in large
fields next year, when, if God smiles upon our
efforts, they will at one bound be forever placed
beyond want and independent. Tell them not to
believe ever that we are not thE;)ir best friencfs;
that their enemies have told them that we would
destroy them; , that we had sent big guns there to
attack them, but that those guns are only to be used
against their enemies if they continue to behave as
they have done.40
'

And a little later he wrote, "I, beg again to impress upon
your mind the planting of the 5,000 trees this winter on the
reservation. If 10,000can be planted and car~d for so much
the better."41
'
Carleton had reason to feel anxious because his task was
complicated in many ways. The superintendent of Indian
affairs was still hostile to his plan, it was difficult to keep
the more restless Navaho from leaving the reservation, the
Comanche were trouplesome, and dishonesty ;raised its head
among the subordinate officials. Relations with Steck were
not improved by a conflict over jurisdiction whiCh flared up
in the fall of 1864. Carleton employed some Ute and Jicarillas, without first consulting the superintendent, to strike
a blow again~t the Indians of the Great Plains. He had a
two-fold purpose in,mind : .the savages were a welcome addition to the fighting force, and arraying the mountain Indians
against the plains Indians would further assure the safety
of the whites. Steck believed that he should have been consulted about this move in advance, and that the art of
peaceful persuasion should have been applied to quiet the
hostiles before military action was resorted to. 42
40. Carleton to Crocker, 10/31/64, R. R., Ser. I, vol. 41, pt. 4, p. 357-59.
The food shortage was so serious in the Territory in the fall of 1864 that no more
Navaho were brought to the reservation until the next spring. R. R., Ser. I, vol. 41,
pt. 4, p. 290-91, 303.
41. 11/6/64, ibUl., p. 461-62.
Grape vines were brought from Isleta and planted on the reservation. Rio Aba;o
Weekly Press, 5/3/64.
42. Carleton to Steck, 11/8/64, and Steck to Carleton, 11/9/64, S524/64.
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When Carson was at the reservation in the summer of
1864, he reported that citizens were jeopardizing the project
by telling the Navaho they were to be returned to their
former home; furthermore, traders were trying to swindle
them out of their few goods. It was also suspected that
many Navaho women were inveigled away when they did
not leave for the' settlements of their own accord. He recommended that a mounted patrol be established to keep out
intruders and to prevent the prisoners from wandering away
from the reservation. 43
Desertions were in fact occurring. The census for
April, 1865, showed a loss of 900 Indians. Some had accepted jobs herding for Mexican ranchers. Others had
slipped away to the mountains to find relief from bodily ailments acquired partly from the water of the Pecos and probably from their new mode of life. To offset this movement,
a system of passports was instituted in the summer and
orders were issued to kill all male Indians caught off the
reservation without passes.44 But meanwhile, Ganado
Blanco and Barboncito Blanco with ten or twelve more
Navaho left the reservation in June. A force of cavalry was
sent in hot pursuit with orders to kill or capture, and the
citizens were called out to aid the troops. These measures
were successful; Ganado and a few of his companions were
killed and the majority of the survivors straggled back to
the reservation. The climax came in November when nearly
all the Mescaleros deserted in a body and returned to their
old haunts.
In February, 1865, scandal broke out in connection with
the quartermaster's department at Fort Sumner and Agent
Labadie. The assistant quartermaster, Captain Norton, was
acquitted by a court martial of the charge of diverting government cattle to the herds of Labadie on his ranch at Agua
Negra, but he was dismissed from the service. Lieutenant
43.
Crocker,
44.
A. A. G.

Carson to Carleton, 7/14/64, R. R., Ser. I, pt. 2, vol. 41, p. 192£. Wood to
1/5/65, ibid., Ser. I, vol. 48, pt. 1, p. 427.
Bristol to Lieut. B. Taylor, Jr., 5/9/65, ibid., Ser. I, vol. 48, pt. 2, p. 378.
to Fort Sumner commander, 8/17/65, A. G. 0., LS 15, p. 88.
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Arnold, who confessed to selling government supplies, was
permitted to resign. Eight other employees were discharged
and Labadie was ordered off the reservation. Under instructions from Steck he had located his agency at his ranch, on
the northern edge of the reservation. The evidence was not
sufficient to convict him of wrong-doing, but the consensus
of opinion was against him. He was discharged a year later
with a clear record, on the grounds that his services were no
longer needed because of the desertion of the Mescaleros: 45
In the midst of these difficulties, the work of organization and civilization made' slow progress. The Bosque' Redondo experiment was not yet fully accepted by the government, so not one phase of the whole project was adequately
supported. In the summer of 1864, the Indians were put to
work making adobes for schoolhouses, since "The education
of these children is the fundamental idea on which must rest
all our hopes of making the Navajoes a civilized and Christian people." 46 Several teachers were engaged, but the results were not encouraging, partly due to the Indians themselves; the idea that education was conducive to their
welfare was not clear to all of them. The jUvenile savages
often stipulated for addItional bread rations .as a
condition of longer attendance at school. The
mothers, too, were equally obtuse [in not appreciating education], arguing that the long-gowned men
ought to pay for the amusement they evidently
found in teaching children. 47
The instructions to Crocker to locate the Navaho in
villages had not been carried out, but the problem of organization was kept in mind. A board of army officers drew
up a semi-military plan in April, 1865. It provided for a
45. Carleton to Maj. Wm. McCleave, 3/9/65, Carleton to A. G., 3/22/65, and
Graves to Cooley, February, 1866, G32/66.
·Labadie was also suspected of stirring up discontent among tbe Navaho, but his
official utterances indicate that he favored the policy of Carleton. S. J. C., 1867, p. 173.
46. Carleton to Secretary of the Interior, 3/30/65, C1343/65. Carleton to Bristol,
7/17/64, R. R., Ser. I, pt. 2, vol. 41, p. 227.
.
47. GWYther, "An Indian Reservation," in Overland Monthlv, X, 127-28 (Feb.
1873).
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division of the Indians into twelve village groups one-half
mile apart, each village to be under the charge of one of the
twelve principal Navaho chiefs; who were to render daily
reports. The. village chief could appoint one sub-chief for
· each 100 Indians. No departures from the village were to
be permitted between the hours of 7 :00 P. M. and 4 :00 or
5 :00 A. M. A court with jurisdiction analogous to a military
tribunal was provided for each village. A right of appeal
lay to a superior court made up of the twelve principal chiefs.
Quarterly sessions were to be held. The twelve principal
· chiefs also were to constitute a superior council presided
over by ali army officer with power to limit the subjects for
discussion. The territorial laws in a modified form would
govern. One factor and six assistants paid from the surplus
crops, were to superintend the farming operations. Arid the
Roman Church was to be installed because the Sandoval band
had already been converted to Catholicism.48
The intensity of conviction and determination of purpose of Carleton were unhappily not held by the higher authorities at Washington. The commissioner of Indian
affairs, of course, was definitely committed to a reservation
policy: "I think it perfectly evident that we shall be guilty
· of little less than criminal neglect if we longer delay the
adoption of such measures as will result in the concentration
of the Indians upon suitable reservations· . . . ;"49 but he
wavered in his attitude toward the Pecos project. In the
spring of 1864 he sought information concerning the Bosque
Redondo· from various sources, consulting among others,
General Canby, John A. Clark, surveyor general for New'
Mexico, and no doubt Collins. At that time he accepted the
fait accompli of Carleton and did "not think it best to look
further for a new home for them [Navaho]." He supported
Carleton's request, backed by the department of war, for
the special appropriation which congress passed in June. 50
48.. S. J. C.• 1867, p. 308.
Annual ReptYrt, 10/31/63, RB 13, p. 430.
Dole to Usher, 4/4/64, RB 13, p. 360.
50.
W369/64. See ;'Iso W437/64.
49.

E. B. Washburn to Dole 3/14/64.
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By mid-summer the opposition of Steck had taken effect.
His evidence, despite Carleton's counter allegations, "should
in my opinion cause us to thoroughly investigate the subject
before proceeding to take such action as will finally commit
this Department to the policy of establishing the reservation
contemplated by the Act of Congress.... "51 In his annual
report he raised the question squarely as to whether the
views of Carleton or of Steck were to be accepted as the basis
for a final settlement of the Navaho problem. His superior,
Secretary Usher, favored a full and fair test of the experiment of locating them at the Bosque· Redondo, because,
having consented to the removal of the Indians, it would be
fickle to return them otherwise. 52
In order to find the answer to the above question, it was
decided to send a special commissioner to New Mexico to
secure first hand and impartial information about the situation. This was particularly necessary because of reluctance
in congress to vote additional money for such a moot project. Upon the recommendation of Senator James Harlan of
the committee on Indian affairs, T. W. Woolson of Mt. Pleasant, Iowa, in whom Harlan had complete confidence, and
whose report he was willing to accept at face value as the
basis for a future policy, was selected for the mission. 53 He
left promptly for New Mexico and interviewed members. of
both parties- to tpe dispute. He found, as General Crocker
expressed it succinctly, the question resolved itself into this:
Would it be better to send them back to their
own country and ailow the old condition of perpetual warfare to be resumed, or would it be wiser,
now that we have them where we can keep a military :Supervision over them, and where we have
every prospect of making them support themselves,
to continue the present state of peace and security
and give these savages the benefit of the energetic
efforts now being made for their civilization. 54

- -51.-Dole
- to Usher, 7/16/64, RB
52.
(1220).
53.
461.
54.

13, p. 491.
C. 1. A., Annual Report, 11/15/64, 38 Congo 2 sess. Hse. Ex. Doc. 1, V, 163
S. 1., Annual Report, 12/5/64, ibid., p. 10-1I.
Harlan to Dole. 11/15/64, H1000/64. Dole to Woolson, 11/23/64, LB 75, p.
Crocker to Harlan, 1/16/65. A. G. 0., LR, CI9/65.
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His answer constituted a victory for Carleton for the time
being. 55 Congress appropriated another $100,000 for subsistence, seeds, and implements, with the proviso that any
.part of the money could be used for furnishing wool to the
Indians whereby they could practice their art of weaving to
their own benefit. The army continued, however, to feed
the prisoners.
The report of Woolson was only the first of the investigations that were to be made before the future of the Navaho
was settled definitely. The most immediate result was the
removal of Steck from the superintendency, April, 1865,
and the appointment of Felipe Delgado.
66.

Carson to Carleton, 2/2/66, ibid., C26/66. Gazette, 4/16/66, 6/17/66.
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